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ABSTRACT 
  How much can one say with confidence about what constitutes 
“the freedom of speech” that Congress shall not abridge? In this 
Article, I address that question in the context of the transmission of 
speech—specifically, the regulation of Internet access known as net 
neutrality. This question has implications both for the future of 
economic regulation, as more and more activity involves the 
transmission of bits, and for First Amendment interpretation. As for 
the latter, the question is what a lawyer or judge can conclude without 
having to choose among competing conceptions of speech. How far 
can a basic legal toolkit go? Using that toolkit, I find that bare 
transmission is not speech under the First Amendment, and that most 
forms of manipulation of bits also would not qualify as speech. 
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Adopting any of the leading conceptions of the First Amendment 
would narrow the range of activities covered by the First Amendment. 
But even without choosing among those conceptions we can reach 
some meaningful conclusions about the limited application of the 
First Amendment to Internet access providers. 
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INTRODUCTION 
On the central question of what is covered by the Free Speech 
Clause of the First Amendment,1 what seems to be settled ground? 
Are threats “speech”? What about conduct that may convey a 
message (e.g., destroying a lab where animals would be tested)? 
Academic commentary and judicial opinions have addressed many of 
these boundary questions—discussing, for instance, when threats and 
conduct are speech under the First Amendment.2 One question that 
has received fairly little attention, however, is the circumstances 
under which the transmission of speech is encompassed by “the 
 
 1. See U.S. CONST. amend. I (“Congress shall make no law . . . abridging the freedom of 
speech . . . .”). 
 2. See, e.g., NLRB v. Gissel Packing Co., 395 U.S. 575, 618 (1969) (finding that “threat[s] 
of retaliation based on misrepresentation and coercion [are outside] the protection of the First 
Amendment”); Frederick Schauer, The Boundaries of the First Amendment: A Preliminary 
Exploration of Constitutional Salience, 117 HARV. L. REV. 1765, 1768 (2004) (“At times the 
First Amendment’s boundaries have figured in the case law and academic commentary, as with 
the familiar debates about whether obscenity, libel, fighting words, and commercial advertising 
are inside or outside the coverage of the First Amendment.”). 
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freedom of speech.”3 As more activity occurs online, the transmission 
of bits of data—and the legal status of that transmission—becomes 
more important. This Article addresses the question of whether, and 
how, the First Amendment constrains the government’s ability to 
impose nondiscrimination rules on the transmitters of those bits.4 
This question is important in its own right, as First Amendment 
scrutiny poses significant hurdles to government regulation.5 To the 
extent that the transmission of bits is treated as part of the freedom of 
speech, regulation of such transmission will be subject to heightened 
judicial scrutiny that will invalidate some regulations that would 
survive absent First Amendment scrutiny.6 Simply stated, regulating 
transmitters of bits will become much more difficult. The 
ramifications of such judicial scrutiny will increase over time: with 
each passing year, more aspects of our lives are encapsulated as bits 
traveling through wires and over the airwaves. 
The question addressed in this Article also highlights larger 
issues about the nature of legal interpretation, and interpretation of 
the Free Speech Clause in particular. That clause has been subject to 
endless debate, with commentators finding little common ground. 
Theorists have put forward a multitude of conceptions of the Free 
Speech Clause, each of which values—and thus treats as speech 
covered by the clause—different forms of communication. Those 
who, for example, think the Free Speech Clause is best understood as 
a protection of personal autonomy see the clause as encompassing 
and protecting a very different set of communications from those who 
 
 3. In this article, I will use the term “freedom of speech” to refer to the freedom protected 
by the Free Speech Clause. That is, I will be using it in a specific legal context, not as a broader 
philosophical term. To avoid visual clutter, in most instances I will refer to the freedom of 
speech without quotation marks. By contrast, I will use the term “speech” to refer to its usage in 
the Free Speech Clause only when I so indicate. 
 4. For the purposes of this Article, I am focusing on the speech interests of Internet access 
providers—the entities that provide Internet service to customers. These companies have been 
the main opponents of net neutrality regulations and the main ones invoking the First 
Amendment against such regulations. Others in the Internet ecosystem—most notably, 
customers—have a different set of interests, and I do not address them in this Article. 
 5. The First Amendment encompasses more than the Free Speech Clause, of course. For 
the purposes of this Article, when I refer to the First Amendment I am referring to its Free 
Speech Clause component. 
 6. See Joseph D. Kearney & Thomas W. Merrill, The Great Transformation of Regulated 
Industries Law, 98 COLUM. L. REV. 1323, 1370 (1998) (“[T]he First Amendment has become the 
preferred constitutional assault vehicle for telecommunications companies challenging 
government regulation.”). For a discussion of judicial scrutiny of speech regulations, see infra 
notes 24–25 and accompanying text. 
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see it as checking government power or enhancing democratic 
deliberation.7 The result is that there is no agreement about what is 
outside the realm of the freedom of speech. One or more theories 
would treat computer code,8 maps,9 and sex10 as speech under the First 
Amendment. It is difficult, if not impossible, to refute one or another 
conception of what the freedom of speech really means. This is not to 
suggest that there is no basis upon which one could choose one 
conception or another, but rather that the basis for choosing one—
and for rejecting others—is heavily dependent on values and goals 
that do not submit to proof. That is, the arguments for these 
conceptions do not, by and large, depend on steps that can be refuted. 
Thus, in the realm of theory, the answer to the question of what 
constitutes the freedom of speech depends on the conception one 
adopts, and one’s choice of conception is more analogous to a purely 
subjective preference than to a conclusion reached by a series of 
falsifiable steps. 
 
 7. See infra notes 54–56 and accompanying text. The question of what is encompassed by 
the First Amendment is different from the question of what is protected by the First 
Amendment. Some speech that is included within the freedom of speech—and thus covered by 
the First Amendment—may not be protected from regulation. Secret battle plans, for instance, 
are speech for First Amendment purposes, but courts, and many theorists, would nonetheless 
permit the regulation of their distribution. This Article focuses on the question of coverage—
what the First Amendment encompasses. See FREDERICK SCHAUER, FREE SPEECH: A 
PHILOSOPHICAL ENQUIRY 89–92 (1982) (discussing the distinction between First Amendment 
coverage and protection); Schauer, supra note 2, at 1771 (“Questions about the boundaries of 
the First Amendment are not questions of strength—the degree of protection that the First 
Amendment offers—but rather are questions of scope—whether the First Amendment applies 
at all.”). 
 8. See Bernstein v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 176 F.3d 1132, 1147 (9th Cir. 1999) (concluding 
that “encryption software, in its source code form and as employed by those in the field of 
cryptography, must be viewed as expressive for First Amendment purposes”), reh’g en banc 
granted and opinion withdrawn, 192 F.3d 1308 (9th Cir. 1999); Schauer, supra note 2, at 1794 
(“The anti-Microsoft and anti-Hollywood claims of the open-source movement focus on the way 
in which computer source codes can be conceived of as a language and therefore as 
speech . . . .”); Lee Tien, Publishing Software as a Speech Act, 15 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 629, 
664–65 (2000) (arguing that using computer code is participating in scientific discourse and, 
therefore, is speech under the First Amendment). 
 9. See Schauer, supra note 2, at 1801–02 (suggesting that maps satisfy at least one of Kent 
Greenawalt’s four factors for First Amendment coverage because they are speech that is 
“general rather than [related] to a specific transaction”). 
 10. See C. Edwin Baker, Scope of the First Amendment Freedom of Speech, 25 UCLA L. 
REV. 964, 1017–18 (1978) (arguing that “sexual behavior between consenting adults” is 
encompassed by the First Amendment); Schauer, supra note 2, at 1794 (“[T]he sexual liberty 
and antipaternalism claims of those who object to laws restricting sexual conduct typically focus 
on those aspects of the sex industry . . . that can be conceptualized as involving free speech 
issues.”). 
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The aim of this Article is to see how far legal scholarship can 
go—and, concomitantly, where it cannot go—relying only on broadly 
accepted sources and forms of reasoning. This, in turn, raises an 
anterior question: what are those broadly accepted sources and forms 
of reasoning? This could be the subject of a book in its own right, but 
I will utilize some basic tools of legal analysis—text, history, Supreme 
Court jurisprudence, basic analogical reasoning, and widely accepted 
conceptions. How far can these tools take us? 
One way of understanding this Article is that it addresses the 
extent to which lawyers can reach any meaningful conclusions about 
what the freedom of speech encompasses by relying on a basic legal 
toolkit and broadly shared principles. Do lawyers and judges need to 
adopt a particular conception of the First Amendment in order to 
decide what the freedom of speech encompasses?11 Part of the 
significance of this question arises from the fact that this approach 
approximates the position of the Supreme Court. Text, history, 
Supreme Court jurisprudence, basic analogical reasoning, and widely 
accepted conceptions are not only lawyers’ but also the Supreme 
Court’s basic toolkit. And the Court has never settled upon a 
conception of the First Amendment. The Court has invoked the 
marketplace of ideas more than any other conception of the First 
Amendment, but different cases have emphasized different 
conceptions, and in many cases the Court has refrained from choosing 
among them.12 This is not surprising: each possible conception of the 
 
 11. See Robert Post, Encryption Source Code and the First Amendment, 15 BERKELEY 
TECH. L.J. 713, 716 (2000) (“[Another theorist] is fundamentally misguided to believe that he 
can explain First Amendment coverage ‘without appealing to a grand theoretical framework of 
First Amendment values.’ If First Amendment coverage does not extend to all speech acts, then 
such a framework is at a minimum necessary in order to provide the criteria by which to select 
the subset of speech acts that merit constitutional attention.” (quoting Tien, supra note 8, at 
636)). 
 12. See Red Lion Broad. Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367, 390 (1969) (“It is the purpose of the 
First Amendment to preserve an uninhibited marketplace of ideas in which truth will ultimately 
prevail . . . .”); Hurley v. Irish-Am. Gay, Lesbian & Bisexual Grp. of Bos., Inc., 515 U.S. 557, 
573–74 (1995) (emphasizing the centrality of autonomy to the First Amendment); Turner 
Broad. Sys., Inc. v. FCC (Turner I), 512 U.S. 622, 641 (1994) (“At the heart of the First 
Amendment lies the principle that each person should decide for himself or herself the ideas 
and beliefs deserving of expression, consideration, and adherence.”); First Nat’l Bank of Bos. v. 
Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 777 n.11 (1978) (“Freedom of expression has particular significance with 
respect to government because ‘[i]t is here that the state has a special incentive to repress 
opposition and often wields a more effective power of suppression.’” (alteration in original) 
(quoting THOMAS I. EMERSON, TOWARD A GENERAL THEORY OF THE FIRST AMENDMENT 9 
(1966))); Mills v. Alabama, 384 U.S. 214, 218 (1966) (“[A] major purpose of [the First] 
Amendment was to protect the free discussion of governmental affairs.”); Robert Post, 
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First Amendment can be subjected to legitimate criticism, and 
reaching agreement at that level of specificity is difficult for any 
group, Justices or otherwise. The Supreme Court’s First Amendment 
jurisprudence is thus one of the many areas characterized by 
incompletely theorized agreements.13 
One can thus fairly present the question addressed by this 
Article as whether conventional legal analysis can meaningfully guide 
the Supreme Court in applying the First Amendment to the 
transmission of bits.14 In this Article, I suggest an affirmative answer. I 
find that the basic legal toolkit counsels against treating the freedom 
of speech as encompassing the application of nondiscrimination rules 
to transmitters of speech. There is fairly little support for treating a 
company’s transmission, standing alone, as speech for First 
Amendment purposes, and there are strong reasons to reach the 
opposite conclusion. The same tools indicate that some forms of 
editing will trigger the First Amendment, and they provide a 
significant amount of guidance in determining what form that editing 
must take. 
That said, none of the arguments I present are ineluctable. If we 
cannot have confidence in analysis that proceeds from widely 
accepted premises and uses widely accepted tools, what should that 
tell us? That we can never have confidence in our interpretations of 
the First Amendment, or that we must wait for the Supreme Court to 
weigh in? That the Supreme Court, in turn, must either choose a 
specific conception of the First Amendment or make an essentially 
arbitrary decision, because conventional legal analysis without a 
specific conception provides no meaningful guidance? 
 
Reconciling Theory and Doctrine in First Amendment Jurisprudence, 88 CALIF. L. REV. 2353, 
2372–73 (2000) (noting that the Supreme Court has not consistently followed any one theory of 
the First Amendment). 
 13. See Cass R. Sunstein, Minimalism at War, 2004 SUP. CT. REV. 47, 48 (“Many judges are 
minimalists; they want to say and do no more than necessary to resolve cases. . . . [Minimalists] 
attempt to reach incompletely theorized agreements, in which the most fundamental questions 
are left undecided. They prefer outcomes and opinions that can attract support from people 
with a wide range of theoretical positions, or with uncertainty about which theoretical positions 
are best. In these ways, minimalist judges avoid the largest questions about the meaning of the 
free speech guarantee, or the extent of the Constitution’s protection of ‘liberty,’ or the precise 
scope of the President’s authority as Commander in Chief of the Armed Forces.” (footnote 
omitted)). 
 14. This is different, of course, from the question of whether such analysis—as opposed to 
other considerations—will actually persuade Justices. Whatever does, in fact, motivate Justices, 
my question here is how much work conventional legal analysis can do. 
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Part I briefly describes what is at stake, noting the net neutrality 
context in which this issue arises and the larger First Amendment 
backdrop. If the First Amendment applies to all regulations of bit 
transmitters, an increasingly large part of the economy will be subject 
to heightened judicial scrutiny. Part II considers the applicability of 
the Free Speech Clause to a company’s transmission of speech, 
standing alone. It finds that neither traditional interpretive tools nor 
any of the proffered conceptions of the First Amendment support the 
idea that bare transmission is part of the freedom of speech. Part III 
asks what manipulation of bits by Internet access providers would 
constitute speech under the First Amendment, and finds that widely 
accepted premises and sources—in particular, precedents and an 
overinclusive definition of “communication”—can provide a fair 
amount of guidance, revealing that most of the activities of Internet 
access providers fall outside the scope of the freedom of speech. 
I.  THE STAKES 
The question of First Amendment coverage on which this article 
focuses arises in the immediate context of Internet access and net 
neutrality—to oversimplify greatly, the proposition that the 
government should prevent broadband Internet access providers 
from engaging in unreasonable discrimination in their treatment of 
Internet traffic.15 The meaning of this formulation depends on the 
definition of unreasonable discrimination, and there has been a 
robust debate as to which actions by Internet access providers should 
be prohibited and which should be permitted.16 The starting position 
for net neutrality proponents is “that the Internet has thrived because 
of its freedom and openness—the absence of any gatekeeper blocking 
lawful uses of the network or picking winners and losers online.”17 
Their concern is that the companies that provide Internet access have 
the incentive and ability to block, degrade, or prioritize particular 
content, applications, services, or devices based on payments or other 
 
 15. There are various terms that can be used to describe the entities involved. 
“[B]roadband Internet access service provider” is the full term that the FCC used in its order on 
the open Internet and net neutrality. See Preserving the Open Internet, 25 FCC Rcd. 17,905, 52 
Commc’ns Reg. (P & F) 1, 49 (Dec. 21, 2010) (report and order). As a convenient shorthand in 
this Article, I will refer to “Internet access providers.” 
 16. See, e.g., Tim Wu & Christopher S. Yoo, Keeping the Internet Neutral?: Tim Wu and 
Christopher Yoo Debate, 59 FED. COMM. L.J. 575 (2007) (debating net neutrality). 
 17. Preserving the Open Internet, 52 Commc’ns Reg. (P & F) at 3. 
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considerations.18 In December 2010, the Federal Communications 
Commission (FCC) issued a lengthy report and order19 staking out its 
own position on net neutrality.20 
Some commentators have addressed the First Amendment issues 
raised by net neutrality regulations. Some have contended that net 
neutrality regulations do not trigger Internet access providers’ free 
speech interests, but their arguments have generally placed heavy 
emphasis on conceptions of the First Amendment that are not 
broadly shared.21 Rejecting the application of the First Amendment to 
regulation of Internet access providers has thus depended on the 
acceptance of a particular vision of the First Amendment. Most 
commentators who have addressed the issue have contended that 
Internet access providers’ First Amendment rights are implicated by 
net neutrality regulations, and have focused on how First 
Amendment scrutiny would apply to such regulations.22 Their 
 
 18. Id. at 8–13; see also id. at 8 (identifying “three [basic] types of Internet activities: 
providing broadband Internet access service; providing content, applications, services, and 
devices accessed over or connected to broadband Internet access service (‘edge’ products and 
services); and subscribing to a broadband Internet access service that allows access to edge 
products and services”). 
 19. Preserving the Open Internet, 25 FCC Rcd. 17,905, 52 Commc’ns Reg. (P & F) 1 (Dec. 
21, 2010) (report and order). 
 20. The FCC order, inter alia, prohibits a fixed Internet access provider from 
“unreasonably discriminat[ing] in transmitting lawful network traffic over a consumer’s 
broadband Internet access service,” but exempts “[r]easonable network management” from this 
prohibition. Id. at 23–24. It defines reasonable network management as: 
ensuring network security and integrity, including by addressing traffic that is harmful 
to the network; addressing traffic that is unwanted by end users (including by premise 
operators), such as by providing services or capabilities consistent with an end user’s 
choices regarding parental controls or security capabilities; and reducing or mitigating 
the effects of congestion on the network. 
Id. at 28 (footnotes omitted). And it states that “a commercial arrangement between a 
broadband provider and a third party to directly or indirectly favor some traffic over other 
traffic in the broadband Internet access service connection to a subscriber of the broadband 
provider (i.e., ‘pay for priority’) would raise significant cause for concern.” Id. at 25. 
 21. See, e.g., Marvin Ammori, Beyond Content Neutrality: Understanding Content-Based 
Promotion of Democratic Speech, 61 FED. COMM. L.J. 273, 303 (2009) (“Government attempts 
to promote democratic content should be subject to a viewpoint-neutral test, not content 
analysis. The most widely accepted values underlying the First Amendment support this 
conclusion, and potential objections do not undermine it.”); Bill D. Herman, Opening 
Bottlenecks: On Behalf of Mandated Network Neutrality, 59 FED. COMM. L.J. 103, 112 (2006) 
(“First Amendment values are best upheld by ensuring media diversity—not merely content 
diversity, but a diversity of stakeholders who have editorial control over that content.”). 
 22. See, e.g., Rob Frieden, Invoking and Avoiding the First Amendment: How Internet 
Service Providers Leverage Their Status as Both Content Creators and Neutral Conduits, 12 U. 
PA. J. CONST. L. 1279, 1321 (2010) (asserting that Internet service providers (ISPs) are First 
Amendment speakers when they operate in a non-neutral way); Randolph J. May, Net 
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assumption seems to be that the precedents applicable to cable 
television operators obviously apply to Internet access providers.23 In 
this Article, I find that any such assumption is too facile. 
This Article uses the example of net neutrality regulation to 
consider the contexts in which bit transmitters’ First Amendment 
interests might be implicated. I consider the kinds of activities that 
broadband access providers might want to engage in but that might 
be limited by net neutrality regulation. 
Net neutrality is only one example, however, of the larger 
question that this Article addresses—the circumstances under which 
transmitters of speech are engaged in speech for First Amendment 
purposes. Net neutrality regulations raise this question, but it can and 
likely will arise in a variety of contexts. 
Those contexts become more numerous and more important 
with each passing year. The continual increase in online activity 
means that more activity takes the form of bits traveling through 
wires and the airwaves. Applying the First Amendment to the 
transmission of bits would mean significant judicial scrutiny of a 
bigger and bigger part of the economy. Regulations that trigger the 
Free Speech Clause are reviewed under intermediate scrutiny at a 
minimum, and strict scrutiny in many contexts. Under strict scrutiny, 
applicable to content-based regulation of speech, the government 
interest must be “compelling” and the statute must be the least 
restrictive means to further the articulated interest24—a test that is 
rarely satisfied. Intermediate scrutiny applies to content-neutral 
 
Neutrality Mandates: Neutering the First Amendment in the Digital Age, 3 ISJLP 197, 202–09 
(2007) (discussing the different ways in which the First Amendment applies to net neutrality 
regulation); Moran Yemini, Mandated Network Neutrality and the First Amendment: Lessons 
from Turner and a New Approach, 13 VA. J.L. & TECH. 1, 21 (2008) (“[C]lassifying network-
neutrality rules as content neutral and therefore subject to intermediate scrutiny is not a hard 
case.”). 
 23. See Frieden, supra note 22, at 1313 (“As a threshold matter, ISPs qualify for some 
degree of First Amendment protection in their capacity as content packagers, in much the same 
way as cable television operators load channels of content onto various programming tiers of 
service.”); May, supra note 22, at 202–03 (“Like newspapers, magazines, cable operators, movie 
and music producers, and even the man or woman preaching on a soapbox, ISPs such as 
Comcast and Verizon possess free speech rights.”); Yemini, supra note 22, at 21–22 (“The 
Court’s line of reasoning in differentiating between cable and broadcast, on the one hand, and 
between cable and newspapers, on the other hand, seems applicable also to [broadband service 
providers] in the context of network neutrality.”). 
 24. See, e.g., Sable Commc’ns of Cal., Inc. v. FCC, 492 U.S. 115, 126 (1989) (“The 
Government may . . . regulate the content of constitutionally protected speech in order to 
promote a compelling interest if it chooses the least restrictive means to further the articulated 
interest.”). 
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regulation of speech and is more frequently satisfied. But 
intermediate scrutiny is still a serious undertaking. The challenged 
regulation must serve an “important or substantial governmental 
interest” unrelated to the suppression of speech and cannot burden 
substantially more speech than is necessary to further that interest.25 
This is much more rigorous review than ordinary economic 
regulation is subject to. The constitutional review of economic 
regulation is very forgiving, and indeed it is hard for the government 
to lose. Review of agency regulations under the Administrative 
Procedure Act has more bite,26 but it is still much less rigorous than 
intermediate scrutiny under the First Amendment. 
Thus what is at stake is whether a growing part of our economy 
and society—the transmission of bits—will be subject to scrutiny that 
will invalidate many ordinary forms of regulation. Note that courts 
could reduce the chances of such invalidation by softening 
intermediate scrutiny—or even creating a new, weaker form of 
scrutiny for the transmission of bits. But before courts start tinkering 
with the levels of scrutiny, they should ask whether the relevant 
activities are covered by the Free Speech Clause in the first place. Of 
course, if that is what the First Amendment calls for, then so be it. 
But is that what the First Amendment calls for? 
II.  TRANSMITTERS OF SPEECH 
If a company acts as a pure transmitter of speech—simply 
moving the speech from A to B without editing the speech or 
exercising a preference among speakers—is it engaging in speech for 
First Amendment purposes? Assume for the purposes of this Part 
that the company acts as a nondiscriminatory transmitter and makes 
no editorial choices, and that the relevant laws require such 
nondiscriminatory transmission but impose no further regulation on 
transmission. Is the mere act of transmission a form of speech, such 
that any regulation of it implicates the Free Speech Clause? 
 
 25. See, e.g., Turner Broad. Sys., Inc. v. FCC (Turner I), 512 U.S. 622, 662 (1994) (“[A] 
content-neutral regulation will be sustained if ‘it furthers an important or substantial 
governmental interest; if the governmental interest is unrelated to the suppression of free 
expression; and if the incidental restriction on alleged First Amendment freedoms is no greater 
than is essential to the furtherance of that interest.’” (quoting United States v. O’Brien, 391 U.S. 
367, 377 (1968))). 
 26. See 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A) (2006) (“The reviewing court shall . . . hold unlawful and set 
aside agency action, findings, and conclusions found to be . . . arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of 
discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with law[.]”).  
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A. The Difficulties with an Argument that Pure Transmission Is 
Speech 
The best argument in favor of applying the First Amendment to 
nondiscrimination regulation of bit transmitters is that the text 
compels it: the transmission of bits is speech, and thus any regulation 
of bit transmitters implicates the First Amendment. This contention 
does not take the analysis very far. At the outset, it bears noting that 
the Free Speech Clause prohibits abridgement of “the freedom of 
speech,” not “speech” standing alone.27 And, needless to say, neither 
“speech” nor “the freedom of speech” is a self-defining term. This is a 
perennial problem with textual analysis of the Free Speech Clause: as 
a textual matter, “speech” and “the freedom of speech” could be 
interpreted in any of a variety of ways. Everyone might agree on 
some core elements, but the textual boundaries of these terms are not 
apparent.28 
Tools of originalism also are of limited help in determining the 
meaning of “the freedom of speech.” As Leonard Levy noted more 
than half a century ago, “The meaning of no other clause of the Bill 
of Rights at the time of its framing and ratification has been [as] 
obscure to us” as the Free Speech Clause.29 That said, the materials 
 
 27. See John Paul Stevens, The Freedom of Speech, 102 YALE L.J. 1293, 1296 (1993) (“I 
emphasize the word ‘the’ as used in the term ‘the freedom of speech’ because the definite article 
suggests that the draftsmen intended to immunize a previously identified category or subset of 
speech. That category could not have been co-extensive with the category of oral 
communications that are commonly described as ‘speech’ in ordinary usage.”); WILLIAM W. 
VAN ALSTYNE, INTERPRETATIONS OF THE FIRST AMENDMENT 24–26 (1984) (emphasizing the 
importance of determining whether some claimed speech is part of the freedom of speech). 
 28. Akhil Amar has argued that intratextualism—identifying terms appearing in different 
parts of the Constitution and interpreting them to have similar meanings—illuminates the 
meaning of “speech” under the Free Speech Clause. In particular, he contends that the term 
“speech” in the Speech or Debate Clause, which provides that senators and representatives 
“shall not be questioned in any other Place” for “any Speech or Debate in either House,” U.S. 
CONST. art. I, § 6, applies only to political speech, and thus we should interpret the Free Speech 
Clause to cover only, or at least primarily, political speech. Akhil Reed Amar, Intratextualism, 
112 HARV. L. REV. 747, 815 (1999). For my purposes, it bears noting that Amar’s interpretation 
of the First Amendment is widely contested, but that, if it were adopted, it would almost 
certainly doom any claim that a company’s transmission of speech is covered by the Free Speech 
Clause. See generally Adrian Vermeule & Ernest A. Young, Commentary, Hercules, Herbert, 
and Amar: The Trouble with Intratextualism, 113 HARV. L. REV. 730 (2000) (criticizing Amar’s 
intratextualism). 
 29. LEONARD W. LEVY, LEGACY OF SUPPRESSION: FREEDOM OF SPEECH AND PRESS IN 
EARLY AMERICAN HISTORY 4 (1960); see also Stanley C. Brubaker, Original Intent and 
Freedom of Speech and Press, in THE BILL OF RIGHTS: ORIGINAL MEANING AND CURRENT 
UNDERSTANDING 82, 85 (Eugene W. Hickok, Jr. ed., 1991) (“The debates in Congress 
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that we do have from the Framing era suggest that those in the 
Framing generation had a narrower conception of the freedom of 
speech than do modern courts, and many in the Framing generation 
adhered to Blackstone’s position that the freedom of speech was best 
understood as a freedom from prior restraints.30 Beyond that, the 
Framing generation emphasized that the freedom of speech was a 
personal right applicable to individuals.31 It is not at all clear how far, 
if at all, the Framing generation would have applied the freedom of 
speech to corporations.32 
We can look to analogical reasoning—probably the most widely 
accepted form of legal reasoning.33 Analogies can be revealing and 
 
concerning the speech and press clauses shed scant light on the question of meaning. . . . Nor do 
we find enlightening comments in the state legislatures that considered the amendments or the 
local newspapers or pamphlets of the time.”). 
 30. See, e.g., LEONARD W. LEVY, JEFFERSON & CIVIL LIBERTIES: THE DARKER SIDE 46 
(1963) (“Jefferson, by contrast, never protested against the substantive law of seditious libel . . . . 
He accepted without question the dominant view of his generation that government could be 
criminally assaulted merely by the expression of critical opinions that allegedly tended to 
subvert it by lowering it in the public’s esteem.”); LEVY, supra note 29, at vii (“The evidence 
drawn particularly from the period 1776 to 1791 indicates that the generation that 
framed . . . the First Amendment was hardly as libertarian as we have traditionally assumed.”); 
Robert H. Bork, Neutral Principles and Some First Amendment Problems, 47 IND. L.J. 1, 22 
(1971) (“In colonial times and during and after the Revolution [early political leaders] displayed 
a determination to punish speech thought dangerous to government, much of it expression that 
we would think harmless and well within the bounds of legitimate discourse.”); G. Edward 
White, Historicizing Judicial Scrutiny, 57 S.C. L. REV. 1, 60, 60 n.294 (2005) (“Since the First 
Amendment only applied against Congress, this approach assumed that the federal government 
could punish seditious, libelous, blasphemous, obscene, or indecent speech with impunity so 
long as it did not censor the speech in advance.”); see also 4 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, 
COMMENTARIES *151 (“The liberty of the press is indeed essential to the nature of a free state: 
but this consists in laying no previous restraints upon publications, and not in freedom from 
censure for criminal matter when published.”). 
 31. See, e.g., Julian N. Eule, Promoting Speaker Diversity: Austin and Metro Broadcasting, 
1990 SUP. CT. REV. 105, 129 (“The framers of the First Amendment could scarcely have 
anticipated its application to the corporate form. That, of course, ought not to be dispositive. 
What is compelling, however, is an understanding of who was supposed to be the beneficiary of 
the free speech guaranty—the individual.”). 
 32. Compare Citizens United v. FEC, 130 S. Ct. 876, 950 (2010) (Stevens, J., concurring in 
part and dissenting in part) (“Unlike our colleagues, [the Framers] had little trouble 
distinguishing corporations from human beings, and when they constitutionalized the right to 
free speech in the First Amendment, it was the free speech of individual Americans that they 
had in mind.”), with id. at 928 (Scalia, J., concurring) (“[T]he individual person’s right to speak 
includes the right to speak in association with other individual persons. . . . The association of 
individuals in a business corporation . . . cannot be denied the right to speak on the simplistic 
ground that it is not ‘an individual American.’”). 
 33. See LLOYD L. WEINREB, LEGAL REASON: THE USE OF ANALOGY IN LEGAL 
ARGUMENT 96 (2005) (stating that “analogical reasoning is not a convenience but a necessity” 
in the law). 
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can legitimately lead lawyers and judges to reject some arguments.34 
If, for instance, under some interpretation the freedom of speech 
would apply to most business decisions, that interpretation would be 
problematic. The First Amendment, after all, flatly prohibits any 
abridgement of the freedom of speech, and interpreting the text to 
apply that prohibition to most business decisions does not seem to be 
a faithful interpretation, under any meaning of the term faithful.35 Just 
as it would misshape and demean the religion clauses of the First 
Amendment to find that “religion” encompassed every belief, it 
would misshape and demean the First Amendment to find that the 
freedom of speech encompassed every act that relates to information. 
“[T]he freedom of speech” is a broad and powerful term, but an 
interpretation that leaves little outside of its ambit is an implausible 
one, as a matter of textual construction. 
In this case, analogical reasoning highlights the implausibility of 
an interpretation of the Free Speech Clause that bare transmission is 
speech. Imagine that FedEx decided to speed up the delivery of 
documents addressed to companies with which it had a financial 
relationship; that is, FedEx would give preferential treatment in its 
delivery schedule to documents sent to companies that paid it for the 
privilege. A congressional decision to ban such a practice may or may 
not be good policy, but it would not seem to raise First Amendment 
issues. Yes, FedEx would be moving First Amendment-protected 
materials—documents—from one user to another, but it is hard to see 
how transporting documents turns a company into a speaker for First 
Amendment purposes. More precisely, the freedom of speech would 
not seem to encompass FedEx’s business model. A company devoted 
to transporting messages with which it agreed—imagine a courier 
service that limited itself to communications between Republican- or 
Democratic-affiliated groups—would be a different matter. In that 
 
 34. See id. at 97 (“[I]f the reasons for a rule are not substantial, that may suggest that the 
analogy supporting its application is weak and that some other analogy pointing to a different 
rule is to be preferred. Or, if the analogy is weak, that may suggest that less weight should be 
given to the reasons for the rule to which the analogy points.”); see also Emily Sherwin, A 
Defense of Analogical Reasoning in Law, 66 U. CHI. L. REV. 1179, 1196 (1999) (remarking that 
the important part of analogical reasoning is “the sense of obligation to study prior cases and 
either conform to them or explain why they should be disregarded”); Cass R. Sunstein, On 
Analogical Reasoning, 106 HARV. L. REV. 741, 775 (1993) (“Principles [of law] are . . . both 
generated and tested through confrontation with particular cases.”). 
 35. For two different discussions of faithful interpretation of the Constitution, see generally 
PHILIP BOBBITT, CONSTITUTIONAL FATE: THEORY OF THE CONSTITUTION (1982); and 
SANFORD LEVINSON, CONSTITUTIONAL FAITH (1989). 
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situation, the act of transmission would entail a communication: “We, 
the Republican [or Democratic] delivery service, are bringing you a 
document from a kindred spirit.” But for a company like FedEx that 
does not so limit itself, there is no similar communication. The arrival 
of a FedEx truck gives no one any information about the content of 
the relevant document.36 
Importantly, the argument that transmission equals speech 
would apply not only to ordinary carriers like FedEx but also to 
common carriers that carry speech. The obvious example is local 
telephone companies. They carry central forms of speech—
conversations. If regulation of speech transmitters really does 
implicate the Free Speech Clause, then most (if not all) regulations of 
common carriers would trigger First Amendment scrutiny that would 
likely invalidate many of them. 
There is nothing, as a matter of logic, that would prohibit the 
application of the First Amendment to the regulation of common 
carriers. But it would fly in the face of history and the consistent legal 
treatment of such carriers. The longstanding historical practice and 
understanding was that common carriers of speech were mere 
transmitters who were not speakers for purposes of the First 
Amendment.37 As a jurisprudential matter, the Supreme Court has 
never suggested First Amendment coverage for bits qua bits, or for all 
speech transmitters. The Court has applied the First Amendment 
only to people or companies who do much more than merely 
transport.38 No court has ever suggested that regulation of such 
carriage triggers First Amendment scrutiny. On the contrary, courts 
have long treated common carriage regimes as not raising First 
Amendment issues. Courts have placed common carriers and other 
mere conduits at the opposite end of the spectrum from speakers, and 
 
 36. A regulation that discriminated against the transmission of political speech, or speech 
on behalf of a political party, would trigger the application of the First Amendment. But the 
problem would be the government seeking to suppress speech based on its content or viewpoint, 
and that would occur whether the underlying activity was the transmission of speech or the 
transmission of electricity. 
 37. See, e.g., Ellis v. Am. Tel. Co., 95 Mass. (13 Allen) 226, 231–32 (1866) (“[A]n owner or 
manager of [a telegraph] line becomes to a certain extent a public servant or agent. . . . He 
cannot refuse to receive and forward despatches; nor can he select the persons for whom he will 
act . . . . He is required to send [messages] for every person who may apply, at a usual or 
uniform tariff or rate, without any undue preference, and according to established regulations 
applicable to all alike.”). 
 38. See infra notes 60–68 and accompanying text. 
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have held that conduits do not have free speech rights of their own.39 
Indeed, even the dissent in Turner Broadcasting System, Inc. v. FCC 
(Turner I),40 which would have invalidated on First Amendment 
grounds a statute requiring cable operators to carry some 
broadcasters, suggested common carriage for cable operators as an 
alternative that would not run afoul of the First Amendment: “[I]t 
stands to reason that if Congress may demand that telephone 
companies operate as common carriers, it can ask the same of cable 
companies; such an approach would not suffer from the defect of 
preferring one speaker to another.”41 Common carriers’ main First 
 
 39. See Denver Area Educ. Telecomms. Consortium v. FCC, 518 U.S. 727, 739 (1996) 
(plurality opinion) (contrasting editors and common carriers for First Amendment purposes); 
Turner Broad. Sys., Inc. v. FCC (Turner I), 512 U.S. 622, 655 (1994) (“Given cable’s long history 
of serving as a conduit for broadcast signals, there appears little risk that cable viewers would 
assume that the broadcast stations carried on a cable system convey ideas or messages endorsed 
by the cable operator.”); FCC v. League of Women Voters, 468 U.S. 364, 378 (1984) 
(distinguishing between broadcasters and common carriers for First Amendment purposes); 
Pruneyard Shopping Ctr. v. Robins, 447 U.S. 74, 87 (1980) (rejecting a shopping center owner’s 
challenge to a state law preventing the owner from restricting messages expressed on its 
property because the shopping center is “a business establishment that is open to the public” 
and, thus, “[t]he views expressed by members of the public in passing out pamphlets or seeking 
signatures for a petition . . . will not likely be identified with those of the owner”). 
 40. Turner Broad. Sys., Inc. v. FCC (Turner I), 512 U.S. 622 (1994). Turner I was a First 
Amendment challenge to the “must carry” provisions, which require cable operators to carry 
local television broadcasters. Id. at 626. 
 41. Id. at 684 (O’Connor, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). The most the Court 
has been willing to say is that applying the First Amendment to a regulation treating cable 
operators (who do have speech rights) as common carriers “is not frivolous.” FCC v. Midwest 
Video Corp., 440 U.S. 689, 709 n.19 (1979) (“The court below suggested that the Commission’s 
rules might violate the First Amendment rights of cable operators. Because our decision rests 
on statutory grounds, we express no view on that question, save to acknowledge that it is not 
frivolous and to make clear that the asserted constitutional issue did not determine or sharply 
influence our construction of the statute.”). 
  In Sable Communications of California, Inc. v. FCC, 492 U.S. 115 (1989), a case 
invalidating statutory restrictions on telephone companies’ carriage of indecent telephone 
messages, Justice Scalia, writing for himself in a concurrence, stated that “while we hold the 
Constitution prevents Congress from banning indecent speech in this fashion, we do not hold 
that the Constitution requires public utilities to carry it.” Id. at 133 (Scalia, J., concurring). In a 
similar vein, several lower courts rejected First Amendment challenges to telephone companies’ 
decisions not to carry indecent messages on the grounds that the telephone companies were not 
state actors. See Info. Providers’ Coal. for Def. of the First Amendment v. FCC, 928 F.2d 866, 
877 (9th Cir. 1991) (“Carriers are private companies, not state actors[,] and accordingly are not 
obliged to continue, restrict or terminate the services of particular subscribers. Thus, a carrier is 
free under the Constitution to terminate service to dial-a-porn operators altogether.” (citation 
omitted)); Carlin Commc’ns, Inc. v. Mountain States Tel. & Tel. Co., 827 F.2d 1291, 1297 (9th 
Cir. 1987) (“The question is whether state action also inhered in Mountain Bell’s decision to 
adopt a policy excluding all ‘adult entertainment’ from the 976 network. We hold that it did 
not.”); Carlin Commc’n, Inc. v. S. Bell Tel. & Tel. Co., 802 F.2d 1352, 1361–62 (11th Cir. 1986) 
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Amendment success—their challenges to 47 U.S.C. § 533(b)—is also 
instructive on this point.42 Neither the common carriers challenging 
the statute nor any of the courts (all of which accepted their 
arguments) suggested that the First Amendment applied to telephone 
common carriage service. Instead, the companies argued, and the 
courts held, that the First Amendment applied to a statutory 
provision that prevented common carriers from “providing video 
programming.”43 
Turning to the Supreme Court’s jurisprudence, the Court has 
never held that the fact that an entity transmits speech means that 
regulation of such a transmitter is a regulation of the freedom of 
speech. Notably, in the 2006 case Rumsfeld v. Forum for Academic 
and Institutional Rights, Inc.,44 the Court stated that “it has never been 
deemed an abridgment of freedom of speech or press to make a 
course of conduct illegal merely because the conduct was in part 
initiated, evidenced, or carried out by means of language, either 
spoken, written, or printed.”45 The Court emphasized that “we have 
extended First Amendment protection only to conduct that is 
inherently expressive,”46 and it has articulated a two-part test for 
 
(finding no state action); see also Denver Area Educ. Telecomms. Consortium, 518 U.S. at 825 
(Thomas, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (“Common carriers are private entities 
and may, consistent with the First Amendment, exercise editorial discretion in the absence of a 
statutory prohibition.”). None of these points bears on the question whether a regulatory 
prohibition on common carriers’ exercise of editorial discretion implicates the First 
Amendment. As I discuss in Part III, any carrier or provider can be a speaker for First 
Amendment purposes if it communicates messages through its manipulation of bits. The issue 
addressed in this Article is the contexts in which Internet access providers are engaged in such 
communications. 
 42. See Cable Communications Policy Act of 1984 § 613(b), 47 U.S.C. § 533(b) (1994) 
(repealed 1996) (prohibiting any common carrier from directly or indirectly providing video 
programming to its subscribers). 
 43. US West, Inc. v. United States, 48 F.3d 1092, 1102 (9th Cir. 1994) (quoting US W., Inc. 
v. United States, 855 F. Supp. 1184, 1191 (W.D. Wash. 1994)), vacated, 516 U.S. 1155 (1996); see 
also Chesapeake & Potomac Tel. Co. of Va. v. United States, 42 F.3d 181, 190 (4th Cir. 1994) 
(“It is clear that the provision of cable television service is a form of ‘speech’ protected by the 
First Amendment.”), vacated, 516 U.S. 415 (1996). 
 44. Rumsfeld v. Forum for Academic & Institutional Rights, Inc., 547 U.S. 47 (2006). 
 45. Id. at 62 (quoting Giboney v. Empire Storage & Ice Co., 336 U.S. 490, 502 (1949) 
(internal quotation marks omitted)). 
 46. Id. at 66; see also City of Dallas v. Stanglin, 490 U.S. 19, 25 (1989) (“It is possible to find 
some kernel of expression in almost every activity a person undertakes—for example, walking 
down the street or meeting one’s friends at a shopping mall—but such a kernel is not sufficient 
to bring the activity within the protection of the First Amendment.”); United States v. O’Brien, 
391 U.S. 367, 376 (1968) (“We cannot accept the view that an apparently limitless variety of 
conduct can be labeled ‘speech’ whenever the person engaging in the conduct intends thereby to 
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determining when particular actions constitute speech: “In deciding 
whether particular conduct possesses sufficient communicative 
elements to bring the First Amendment into play, we have asked 
whether ‘[a]n intent to convey a particularized message was present, 
and [whether] the likelihood was great that the message would be 
understood by those who viewed it.’”47 The transmission of bits fails 
this test. Mere transmission does not reveal an intent to convey a 
message, and no message is likely to be understood. 
Those arguing for application of the First Amendment to mere 
transmitters focus on the proposition that the transmitters’ service is 
equivalent to the programming choices made by cable operators and 
thus is covered by the Supreme Court’s statement in Turner I that 
cable programmers and cable operators engage in speech protected 
by the First Amendment.48 Crucially, nothing in Turner I suggests that 
mere transmission constitutes speech for First Amendment purposes; 
in fact the opinion suggests the opposite. The key quotation from 
Turner I is illuminating: 
Cable programmers and cable operators engage in and transmit 
speech, and they are entitled to the protection of the speech and 
press provisions of the First Amendment. Through “original 
programming or by exercising editorial discretion over which 
stations or programs to include in its repertoire,” cable programmers 
 
express an idea.”); Wisconsin v. Mitchell, 508 U.S. 476, 484 (1993) (quoting this language from 
O’Brien with approval); Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397, 404 (1989) (same). The quoted 
language from Rumsfeld, in focusing on conduct alone, has been subject to some criticism. See 
Dale Carpenter, Unanimously Wrong, 2006 CATO SUP. CT. REV. 217, 243 (“No prior majority 
opinion on the subject has suggested that in deciding whether conduct is expressive we should 
look only at the conduct itself, rather than at both the conduct and the context in which it 
occurs.”). But whether the focus is on conduct alone or conduct plus context, the key point is 
that there must be meaningful expression. 
 47. Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397, 404 (1989) (quoting Spence v. Washington, 418 U.S. 
405, 410–11 (1974) (per curiam)). 
 48. See Reply Comments of the National Cable & Telecommunications Ass’n at 41–42, 
Preserving the Open Internet, 25 FCC Rcd. 17,905, 52 Commc’ns Reg. (P & F) 1 (Dec. 21, 2010) 
(report and order) (GN Docket No. 09-191), available at http://fjallfoss.fcc.gov/ecfs/document/
view?id=7020437442 (“The same ‘it’s-just-transmission’ argument could be made . . . about 
providers of cable service, given the fact that cable operators ultimately deliver the speech that 
they have chosen to offer to their customers.”); Comments of Verizon & Verizon Wireless at 
112, Preserving the Open Internet, 52 Commc’ns Reg. (P & F) 1 (GN Docket No. 09-191), 
available at http://fjallfoss.fcc.gov/ecfs/document/view?id=7020378523 (analogizing Internet 
access providers to cable operators); LAURENCE H. TRIBE & THOMAS C. GOLDSTEIN, 
PROPOSED “NET NEUTRALITY” MANDATES COULD BE COUNTERPRODUCTIVE AND VIOLATE 
THE FIRST AMENDMENT 3 (2009), available at http://fjallfoss.fcc.gov/ecfs/document/view?id
=7020375998 (same); supra notes 22–23 and accompanying text. 
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and operators “see[k] to communicate messages on a wide variety of 
topics and in a wide variety of formats.”49 
This passage is not consistent with the proposition that bare 
transmission implicates the First Amendment. Otherwise, the Court 
presumably would have said as much and let the matter rest there. 
Instead, the Court stated that the First Amendment applied because 
cable programmers and operators “engage in and transmit speech.” 
The Court then further explicated that what made cable operators 
speakers was their own programming and their practice of “exercising 
editorial discretion” over which programs and stations to include (and 
thus which to exclude), entailing their “‘see[king] to communicate 
messages.’”50 
Note that nothing in any of this discussion depends on the 
transmitter having the status of a common carrier. For transmission 
qua transmission, it does not matter for First Amendment purposes 
whether the entity engaging in that transmission is treated as a 
common carrier. The points above would apply with equal force to an 
entity that is not regarded as a common carrier that engaged in pure 
transmission. So, for instance, in the previously discussed FedEx 
example,51 FedEx would not have a First Amendment challenge to a 
regulation banning discrimination whether it was formally treated as 
a common carrier or not. The point about common carriage is that if 
bare transmission were speech, then common carriers would be 
engaged in speech. That is, a conclusion that mere transmission 
implicated the First Amendment would apply to common carriage. 
Other possible arguments that bit transmission constitutes 
speech for First Amendment purposes depend on a prior decision 
that transmission constitutes speech, and thus rely on, rather than 
advance, the key assertion at issue here. One such argument is that 
refusing to either favor or disfavor bits is speech under the First 
Amendment. This argument flows from the fact that bit transmitters 
have the technological ability to alter some of their transmissions if 
they choose—to speed up, slow down, or block particular 
transmissions. They may or may not bother to develop these 
 
 49. Turner Broad. Sys., Inc. v. FCC (Turner I), 512 U.S. 622, 636 (1994) (alteration in 
original) (citation omitted) (quoting City of Los Angeles v. Preferred Commc’ns, Inc., 476 U.S. 
488, 494 (1986)). As the internal quotation indicates, the Court put forward the same test in City 
of Los Angeles v. Preferred Communications, Inc., 476 U.S. 488, 494 (1986). 
 50. Turner I, 512 U.S. at 636 (quoting Preferred Commc’ns, 476 U.S. at 494). 
 51. See supra text accompanying note 36. 
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capabilities, but the capabilities still exist. In light of these abilities, is 
the decision not to utilize them a form of speech for First 
Amendment purposes? The argument in support is fairly 
straightforward: transmitters’ refusal to favor or disfavor bits is an 
editorial choice that sends a message to the world, just as much as 
sending an explicit announcement would. 
The problem with this argument can be seen by taking it out of 
the context of bits. Imagine that some carriers of oil or gas gave 
preferential service to some companies’ oil or gas, and other oil or gas 
carriers treated all companies’ oil or gas equally, with no favor or 
disfavor toward any company’s products. Both sets of carriers would 
be making choices that could be construed as communicating a 
message—“We give preferential treatment” versus “We treat every 
molecule of oil/gas the same”—but one would not treat either set of 
carriers’ actions as implicating the First Amendment. Or, to put the 
point differently, if courts treated the First Amendment as applicable 
here, then the First Amendment would apply to every regulation. 
After all, a company could always claim that each of its practices 
communicates a message, and so any interference with any of its 
practices would interfere with its speech. Such an interpretation of 
the freedom of speech borders on the farcical, as it would be hard to 
imagine what the First Amendment would not apply to. 
The point is that in order to treat a decision not to discriminate 
as triggering the First Amendment, the underlying activity must be 
speech. If transmitting bits were speech under the First Amendment, 
then refusing to give preferential treatment would also be speech. 
Nothing about a refusal to discriminate advances the argument that 
transmitting bits is speech. The status of the underlying activity as 
speech is necessary (but not sufficient) for a refusal to discriminate to 
fall within the freedom of speech. 
This discussion demonstrates the problems with two closely 
related arguments—that the decision not to favor or disfavor bits is a 
form of silence under the First Amendment, and that forcing 
companies to carry bits they do not wish to carry is a form of 
compelled speech.52 The argument based on silence is simply another 
form of the argument just discussed. Characterizing the refusal to 
discriminate as silence instead of speech does not change the analysis: 
 
 52. See, e.g., May, supra note 22, at 202 (“Because neutrality mandates invariably require 
ISPs to send or post content which the ISPs might prefer not to send or post, they are, in effect, 
speech restrictions that infringe the ISPs’ constitutional rights.”). 
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silence can trigger the First Amendment only in the context of 
speech. The example regarding transmitters of oil or gas applies here 
as well. Or, to give a different illustration, a widget monopolist that 
chooses to be silent in response to other companies’ requests to use 
its services cannot plausibly claim that its silence is speech under the 
First Amendment, any more than it could claim that its affirmative 
attempts to harm competition are speech under the First 
Amendment. Silence, standing alone, does not trigger First 
Amendment scrutiny. The relevant nonsilent activity must be speech 
in order for its absence—the silence—to constitute speech under the 
First Amendment. These arguments similarly apply to any suggestion 
of compelled speech. No transmitter of oil or gas could plausibly 
assert that being forced to carry some companies’ oil or gas is 
compelled speech. As with the two arguments just discussed in the 
silence context, a claim of compelled speech depends on a prior 
decision that the bit transmitters are in fact speakers.53 
B. Conceptions of the First Amendment and Pure Transmission 
The discussion in Section A focuses on considerations that courts 
have traditionally emphasized in free speech analysis. It leaves out a 
major focus of some scholars—normative conceptions of the best way 
to understand the First Amendment. Scholars have put forward 
different underlying theories of the First Amendment—visions about 
what the freedom of speech really means and therefore how it should 
be understood. The main conceptions that have been offered over the 
years are the marketplace of ideas, the search for truth, the 
government-checking function, self-government, democratic 
deliberation, personal autonomy, and individual self-expression.54 
 
 53. See Rumsfeld v. Forum for Academic & Institutional Rights, Inc., 547 U.S. 47, 63–64 
(2006) (“The compelled-speech violation in each of our prior cases, however, resulted from the 
fact that the complaining speaker’s own message was affected by the speech it was forced to 
accommodate. . . . In this case, accommodating the military’s message does not affect the law 
schools’ speech, because the schools are not speaking when they host interviews and recruiting 
receptions.”). 
 54. On self-government and democratic deliberation, see generally ALEXANDER 
MEIKLEJOHN, FREE SPEECH AND ITS RELATION TO SELF-GOVERNMENT (1948); ROBERT C. 
POST, CONSTITUTIONAL DOMAINS: DEMOCRACY, COMMUNITY, MANAGEMENT 119–78 (1995); 
CASS R. SUNSTEIN, DEMOCRACY AND THE PROBLEM OF FREE SPEECH (1993); and Harry 
Kalven, Jr., The New York Times Case: A Note on “the Central Meaning of the First 
Amendment,” 1964 SUP. CT. REV. 191. On the marketplace of ideas, see Red Lion Broadcasting 
Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367, 390 (1969); Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 630 (1919) (Holmes, 
J., dissenting); and JOHN STUART MILL, ON LIBERTY 9–10 (Elizabeth Rapaport ed., Hackett 
Publ’g Co. 1978) (1859). On the search for truth, see generally William P. Marshall, In Defense 
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All these conceptions would agree on a core that the freedom of 
speech would include—most notably political speech.55 But the 
different theories lead to quite different conclusions about what the 
freedom of speech would exclude. For example, theories based on 
self-government or democratic deliberation would not include 
pornography or commercial advertising within the ambit of the First 
Amendment, the search-for-truth theory would exclude 
communications with no truth value, and a desire to check the 
government would not justify including speech that has nothing 
whatever to do with governance.56 
The transmission of bits is a rare example of a speech-related 
activity that all these conceptions of the freedom of speech would 
exclude. That is, each one of these approaches would agree that a 
company’s nondiscriminatory transmission should not be treated as 
speech under the First Amendment. The theory that would sweep the 
most within the freedom of speech is the marketplace of ideas. 
Whereas other theories indicate particular purposes that the First 
 
of the Search for Truth as a First Amendment Justification, 30 GA. L. REV. 1 (1995). On 
autonomy, see generally C. EDWIN BAKER, HUMAN LIBERTY AND FREEDOM OF SPEECH 194–
224 (1989); Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Two Senses of Autonomy, 46 STAN. L. REV. 875 (1994); and 
Harry H. Wellington, On Freedom of Expression, 88 YALE L.J. 1105 (1979). On the checking 
function, see generally Vincent Blasi, The Checking Value in First Amendment Theory, 1977 
AM. B. FOUND. RES. J. 521. On self-expression, see generally MARTIN H. REDISH, FREEDOM 
OF EXPRESSION: A CRITICAL ANALYSIS (1984); and David A.J. Richards, Free Speech and 
Obscenity Law: Toward a Moral Theory of the First Amendment, 123 U. PA. L. REV. 45 (1974). 
No theory has been widely accepted as explaining or driving First Amendment doctrine. See, 
e.g., EMERSON, supra note 12, at vii (“Despite the mounting number of decisions and an even 
greater volume of comment, no really adequate or comprehensive theory of the First 
Amendment has been enunciated, much less agreed upon.”); DANIEL A. FARBER, THE FIRST 
AMENDMENT 6 (2d ed. 2002) (“For a while there was a trend toward single-value theories of 
First Amendment law, in which a scholar would posit a single underlying constitutional value 
and then attempt to deduce all First Amendment doctrine from that value. Such efforts, 
whatever their merits, never seemed to persuade many other scholars and were almost entirely 
ignored by the courts.”). 
 55. See Lillian R. BeVier, On the Enduring Dilemma of Judicial Review, 39 EMORY L.J. 
1229, 1238–39 (1990) (“[T]here is consensus that political speech is at the amendment’s core. 
Even today, however, there is no agreement about the periphery, about the other kinds of 
speech the amendment protects and why. Nor is there consensus yet about the underlying 
rationale for the protection of political speech.”); see also MEIKLEJOHN, supra note 54, at 26 
(“[T]he vital point, as stated negatively, is that no suggestion of policy shall be denied a hearing 
because it is on one side of the issue rather than another.”); Bork, supra note 30, at 26 (stating 
that the First Amendment protects only “explicitly and predominantly political speech”); Paul 
B. Stephan III, The First Amendment and Content Discrimination, 68 VA. L. REV. 203, 207–08 
(1982) (stating that “the central meaning of the First Amendment lies in its protection of debate 
of public issues”). 
 56. Schauer, supra note 2, at 1785–86. 
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Amendment should serve, this theory posits that all ideas should be 
treated as part of the freedom of speech, and listeners (constituting 
the marketplace for those ideas) can evaluate them. The marketplace 
theory is sometimes criticized for bringing too much within the ambit 
of the freedom of speech—it would protect ideas no matter how 
repulsive, irrelevant to important values, or crassly commercial.57 
Indeed, a key facet (and, for many theorists, attraction) of the other 
conceptions of speech is that they would not indiscriminately protect 
all ideas, but instead would encompass those that advance the 
relevant purpose (for example, democratic deliberation). 
Holding the marketplace of ideas aside for the moment, a 
company’s nondiscriminatory transmission does not meet any of the 
purposes that theorists have laid out; nondiscriminatory transmission 
has no content, so it does nothing to enhance democratic deliberation, 
check the government, or meet any of the other stated purposes. 
Transmission can enable democratic deliberation and personal 
autonomy, but so can roads and public transportation. Transmission, 
after all, is just a form of transportation.58 The idea behind these 
conceptions of speech is that there is some content that should be 
included in (and protected by) the First Amendment in order to 
preserve democratic deliberation or personal autonomy, and a 
company’s nondiscriminatory transmission does not qualify. 
The marketplace of ideas casts its net more widely by refusing to 
find some ideas more valuable than others, but it is still a marketplace 
of ideas. The proposition is that the government should not pass 
judgment among competing ideas, but should instead let them 
 
 57. See, e.g., Jeannine Bell, O Say, Can You See: Free Expression by the Light of Fiery 
Crosses, 39 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 335, 339 (2004) (arguing that the marketplace of ideas 
paradigm overprotects hate speech). 
 58. In some situations a regulation of specific kinds of transportation may be an attempt to 
suppress content and thus implicate the freedom of speech. Imagine a statute that prohibited 
use of the roads for political purposes. This is the theory behind the application of the First 
Amendment to regulations of campaign expenditures and contributions: when the government 
limits the use of money to pay for political speech, it is singling out for regulation one of many 
inputs into speech. The point of the jurisprudence is not that money equals speech, but that 
regulations aimed at political speech implicate the First Amendment, even when they target an 
input of speech rather than the speech itself. See Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 16 (1976) (“[T]his 
Court has never suggested that the dependence of a communication on the expenditure of 
money operates itself to introduce a nonspeech element or to reduce the exacting scrutiny 
required by the First Amendment.”); Eugene Volokh, Why Buckley v. Valeo Is Basically Right, 
34 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 1095, 1101 (2002) (“Money isn’t speech. But restricting speech that uses money 
is a speech restriction.”). This is quite different from a law prohibiting discrimination in the 
transmission of bits, which of course does not target content in any way. 
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compete. But what are competing are different ideas.59 And the point 
made in the previous paragraph applies here as well: a company’s 
nondiscriminatory transportation (of bits or anything else) enables 
communication, but it has no content, and thus expresses no ideas. 
C. Confidence 
The argument that transmission qua transmission triggers the 
First Amendment is thus weak. But one could make the following 
counterargument to the analysis presented in this Part: a company’s 
transmission of bits is its transmission of “speech” under the First 
Amendment, and thus is part of “the freedom of speech.” This 
creates a strong presumption that the Free Speech Clause applies to 
any regulation of transmitters. There is no Supreme Court case that 
overcomes that presumption, nor do any of the other points 
marshalled in this Part. After all, the Supreme Court has never held 
that a transmitter is not covered by the First Amendment. Indeed, the 
Court has never even held that common carriage is not part of the 
freedom of speech. Courts and commentators have long treated 
common carriage as not implicating the First Amendment, but those 
views were ill-considered or wrong—common carriers are engaged in 
speech for purposes of the First Amendment. Yes, the Court’s 
language in Turner I describing why cable operators are speakers is 
hard to explain if the Court believes that transmission alone turns 
cable operators into speakers, but (so the argument would go) that is 
not enough to defeat the hypothetically strong presumption arising 
from the text of the Free Speech Clause. Thus the presumption 
created by the text of the First Amendment has not been overcome, 
and a company’s transmission is best understood as part of the 
freedom of speech. 
The key move in the last paragraph is the presumption that 
transmission is speech. Absent fairly broad agreement about 
interpretive modalities or dispositive legal sources squarely on point, 
defaults and presumptions can do a tremendous amount of work. 
 
 59. Robert Post argues that communication of ideas is necessary but not sufficient under 
the marketplace of ideas. See Post, supra note 12, at 2366 (“It is . . . inaccurate to infer that the 
theory of the marketplace of ideas requires that the First Amendment protect all speech that 
communicates ideas. Instead, the theory requires the protection only of speech that 
communicates ideas and that is embedded in the kinds of social practices that produce truth.”). 
But communication of ideas is a sine qua non. 
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Does this mean that one cannot say anything about the coverage 
of the First Amendment beyond the trivial (for example, that murder 
is not speech)? That one cannot, as a competent legal analyst, identify 
one side of the argument as more persuasive than the other? I do not 
think so. I think the argument on one side is stronger. But if I ask 
instead my level of confidence in that position, and in particular 
whether I can rule out the contrary position, that is a quite different 
matter. Of course, this is not unique to transmission and speech: 
interpretive claims that are truly beyond the pale are few and far 
between, because some interpretive modality can support most any 
proposition. That may be a source of concern—and indeed, 
embarrassment—for lawyers and legal scholars, but addressing that 
issue is not my project here. My point, rather, is that I cannot rule out 
the arguments for transmission constituting the freedom of speech, 
but I can say that the arguments for that position are weak, and the 
arguments against it are strong. 
This is not the end of the story, however, because one must still 
ask what beyond bare transmission constitutes speech for First 
Amendment purposes. I turn now to that issue. 
III.  EDITING AND COMMUNICATING 
The previous Part indicates that a company’s bare transmission is 
not speech for First Amendment purposes, so regulations prohibiting 
discrimination in transmission do not, without more, trigger 
application of the Free Speech Clause. But Internet access providers 
may want to engage in various forms of manipulation of the bits that 
they transmit. What forms of such manipulation would constitute 
speech that implicates the Free Speech Clause? 
A. Broadly Accepted Sources and Forms of Reasoning 
We can start with the Supreme Court, which has proffered an 
answer to this question. As I noted above, in Turner I the Court 
concluded that cable programmers and operators engage in speech. 
The reason, according to the Court, is that “[t]hrough ‘original 
programming or by exercising editorial discretion over which stations 
or programs to include in its repertoire,’ cable programmers and 
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operators ‘see[k] to communicate messages on a wide variety of 
topics and in a wide variety of formats.’”60 
Does this do any work? Yes. This reasoning presents two 
elements: first, that cable programmers and operators either create 
programming or choose what to air; and, second, that in doing so they 
seek to communicate messages on a variety of topics. The Court does 
not state explicitly that both elements are required, but the structure 
of the sentence so suggests, and, more importantly, having one 
without the other would not seem to constitute speech. The notion of 
seeking to communicate without actually editing or creating anything 
runs into the problem discussed in the previous Part: a company, in 
refusing to discriminate among the bits that it transmits, may seek to 
communicate a message (e.g., “We do not discriminate among bits”), 
but it is hard to see how it has engaged in speech. Otherwise, common 
carriers could say that they are speakers simply because they have not 
sought to discriminate (by challenging the regulations applicable to 
them). Indeed, one could imagine a wonderful form of bootstrapping: 
a common carrier challenging a regulation prohibiting discrimination 
as invalid under the First Amendment, and the First Amendment 
applying because the common carrier engaged in speech by refraining 
from challenging its regulation. As to the converse possibility, one 
could imagine editing that does not seek to communicate. Consider a 
computer editing function that automatically replaces words of eight 
or more letters with shorter synonyms, as a way of reducing the 
number of pages in a document without changing its substance. This 
would not only be a pretty terrible editor, but also one that is not 
communicating anything by its editing. There would be editing but no 
communication and thus no speech for First Amendment purposes. 
It may be that the real communication of every company in every 
decision it makes is “We want to make money.” Indeed, for a 
company that is a faithful agent, with shareholders who want the 
highest possible return, one would expect that everything it did was 
done in order to maximize shareholder value. But the point of free 
speech jurisprudence is that some of those company decisions entail a 
substantive communication—whatever the real motivation may have 
been—and others do not. 
The formulation from Turner I comports with theory and 
practice. The Court and theorists have always required substantive 
 
 60. Turner Broad. Sys., Inc. v. FCC (Turner I), 512 U.S. 622, 636 (1994) (quoting City of 
Los Angeles v. Preferred Commc’ns, Inc., 476 U.S. 488, 494 (1986) (alteration in original)). 
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communication or self-expression as a requirement for the 
application of the First Amendment.61 In every case in which the 
Court has applied the First Amendment, abridgement of substantive 
communication has been the issue.62 Some of those abridgements are 
 
 61. See, e.g., Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 484 (1956) (stating that the First 
Amendment “was fashioned to assure unfettered interchange of ideas for the bringing about of 
political and social changes desired by the people”); SCHAUER, supra note 7, at 94 
(“Communication dominates all the arguments that would with any plausibility generate a Free 
Speech Principle.”); Steven G. Gey, Why Should the First Amendment Protect Government 
Speech When the Government Has Nothing to Say?, 95 IOWA L. REV. 1259, 1274 (2010) (“The 
Supreme Court has been very clear about the First Amendment requirement that speakers must 
engage in definitive communication before receiving constitutional protection for speech.”); 
Frederick Schauer, Speech and “Speech”—Obscenity and “Obscenity”: An Exercise in the 
Interpretation of Constitutional Language, 67 GEO. L.J. 899, 920 (1979) (“The Court is saying 
that the communication of ideas is at once the essential first amendment purpose and the 
essential first amendment property.”). 
  One might reasonably ask what work “self-expression” is doing in the formulation in 
the text, on the assumption that self-expression is a substantive communication. Adding “self-
expression” clarifies the inclusion of forms of expression that have been recognized as 
implicating the freedom of speech even though they arguably do not entail a clear substantive 
communication—in particular, recognized forms of art and symbolism. See Hurley v. Irish-Am. 
Gay, Lesbian & Bisexual Grp. of Bos., Inc., 515 U.S. 557, 569 (1995) (“The protected expression 
that inheres in a parade is not limited to its banners and songs, however, for the Constitution 
looks beyond written or spoken words as mediums of expression. Noting that ‘[s]ymbolism is a 
primitive but effective way of communicating ideas,’ our cases have recognized that the First 
Amendment shields such acts as saluting a flag (and refusing to do so), wearing an armband to 
protest a war, displaying a red flag, and even ‘[m]arching, walking or parading’ in uniforms 
displaying the swastika. As some of these examples show, a narrow, succinctly articulable 
message is not a condition of constitutional protection, which if confined to expressions 
conveying a ‘particularized message,’ would never reach the unquestionably shielded painting of 
Jackson Pollock, music of Arnold Schoenberg, or Jabberwocky verse of Lewis Carroll.” 
(alterations in original) (citations omitted) (quoting W. Va. State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 
U.S. 624, 632 (1943); Nat’l Socialist Party of Am. v. Village of Skokie, 432 U.S. 43, 43 (1977) 
(per curiam); Spence v. Washington, 418 U.S. 405, 411 (1974) (per curiam))). One may 
reasonably contend that works of art and symbolism, and self-expression more generally, do 
entail a substantive communication, so adding “or self-expression” in fact adds nothing to the 
category of “substantive communication.” I include both terms only in an excess of caution, to 
ensure that I have included everything that has been treated as part of the freedom of speech. 
  Even if “self-expression” does add something to “substantive communication,” it does 
not do so in the context of Internet access providers. It seems safe to say that Internet access 
providers do not produce works of art or symbolism, and it is difficult to imagine what activities 
of an Internet access provider could constitute “self-expression” but not “substantive 
communication.” (Indeed, one may fairly claim that no activity of an Internet access provider 
could be self-expression, but that is a stronger claim that is not necessary for this argument.) For 
ease of exposition, I will simply refer to substantive communication in the remainder of this 
Article, given that “self-expression” may not add anything and, in any event, does not add 
anything in terms of the activities in which Internet access providers engage. 
 62. See, e.g., Rumsfeld v. Forum for Academic & Institutional Rights, Inc., 547 U.S. 47, 66 
(2005) (noting that the Supreme Court has “extended First Amendment protection only to 
conduct that is inherently expressive”); Spence, 418 U.S. at 409 (finding that the display of an 
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content neutral, but the key is that they are interfering with a person’s 
or entity’s ability to communicate content. The touchstone of the 
Court’s First Amendment cases has always been that the underlying 
activity entails an expression of ideas, even if it is not “a narrow, 
succinctly articulable message.”63 
This does not mean that the bar for exercising editorial 
discretion and “‘see[king] to communicate messages on a wide variety 
of topics’” is high in this formulation. After all, cable operators 
generally do not have an all-encompassing philosophy that they are 
trying to foist on their viewers.64 But in choosing among possible 
channels, they are choosing to offer subscribers some perspectives of 
the world (e.g., Fox News, MSNBC, and C-SPAN) and not others 
(e.g., Al Jazeera or Mexico’s equivalent of C-SPAN). 
This dovetails with Hurley v. Irish-American Gay, Lesbian and 
Bisexual Group of Boston, Inc.65 In that case, the Court ruled that 
regulation of Boston’s St. Patrick’s Day parade triggered the First 
Amendment, because the parade was speech for First Amendment 
purposes.66 The Court, in rejecting the argument that a parade was 
“merely ‘a conduit’ for the speech of participants in the parade 
‘rather than itself the speaker,’” stated that “the parade does not 
consist of individual, unrelated segments that happen to be 
transmitted together for individual selection by members of the 
audience. Although each parade unit generally identifies itself, each is 
understood to contribute something to a common theme.”67 The 
Court explained that, “[r]ather like a composer, the Council [running 
the parade] selects the expressive units of the parade from potential 
participants, and though the score may not produce a particularized 
message, each contingent’s expression in the Council’s eyes comports 
with what merits celebration on that day.”68 The parade did not have 
a single, clear message, but—to use the parlance of Turner I—the 
parade’s organizers did exercise editorial discretion through which 
they sought to communicate messages. 
 
American flag with peace symbols was an activity “sufficiently imbued with elements of 
communication to fall within the scope of the First and Fourth Amendments”). 
 63. Hurley, 515 U.S. at 569. 
 64. The closest thing to a coherent message would be “Cable television service is worth 
every penny you’re paying for it.” 
 65. Hurley v. Irish-Am. Gay, Lesbian & Bisexual Grp. of Bos., Inc., 515 U.S. 557 (1995). 
 66. Id. at 568–69. 
 67. Id. at 576. 
 68. Id. at 574. 
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First Amendment theory leads to the same conclusion as the 
Court’s jurisprudence. As I already noted, there is no broad 
agreement on the precise contours of what constitutes speech. Every 
proffered definition of communication—and of the freedom of 
speech—has its detractors. 
But this disagreement should not obscure two larger points. The 
first is that every conception of the First Amendment requires some 
substantive communication.69 The theories differ only as to which 
sorts of communications the First Amendment should encompass and 
protect. Even the conception that would cover the most forms of 
communication—the marketplace of ideas—is still a marketplace of 
ideas. 
The other is that the legal community has a working definition of 
communication that may be overinclusive, but that includes 
everything courts and theorists have regarded as communication. 
Communication seems to require, at a minimum, a speaker who 
transmits some substantive message or messages70 to a listener who 
can recognize that message.71 Conveying something other than a 
substantive message—say, high frequency electromagnetic radiation 
designed to destroy a building or smash atoms—is not speech. X-rays 
are many things, but speech is not one of them. (Consider the 
absurdity of an X-ray machine manufacturer challenging a regulation 
of X-ray machines on the ground that regulating X-rays is regulating 
speech.) Attempting to transmit a substantive message that is not 
readily recognizable is not communication or speech, because the 
 
 69. See supra notes 59, 61 and accompanying text; see also Eugene Volokh, Speech as 
Conduct: Generally Applicable Laws, Illegal Courses of Conduct, “Situation-Altering 
Utterances,” and the Uncharted Zones, 90 CORNELL L. REV. 1277, 1304 (2005) (“Under nearly 
every theory of free speech, the right to free speech is at its core the right to communicate—to 
persuade and to inform people through the content of one’s message.”). 
 70. In the remainder of this Article, I will use the term “message” to refer to one or more 
messages for the sake of convenience and brevity, thereby avoiding the repetition of the 
awkward “message or messages.” 
 71. See, e.g., Melville B. Nimmer, The Meaning of Symbolic Speech Under the First 
Amendment, 21 UCLA L. REV. 29, 36 (1973) (“Whatever else may or may not be true of speech, 
as an irreducible minimum it must constitute a communication. That, in turn, implies both a 
communicator and a communicatee—a speaker and an audience.”); KENT GREENAWALT, 
SPEECH, CRIME, AND THE USES OF LANGUAGE 54 (1989) (“When the message is an aspect of 
what the actor is trying to do and is understood by the audience as such, we can say comfortably 
that the act communicates the message and that the free speech principle is relevant.”); Thomas 
Scanlon, A Theory of Freedom of Expression, 1 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 204, 206 (1972) (“[By] ‘acts 
of expression’ . . . I mean to include any act that is intended by its agent to communicate to one 
or more persons some proposition or attitude.”). 
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message has not been communicated. A person who drinks milk out 
of a sippy cup as a protest against government spending may have in 
mind a message (e.g., the government is treating its citizens like 
children), but she has failed to communicate it. Thus, in order to 
communicate, one must have a message that is sendable and 
receivable and that one actually sends. Put differently, there are three 
basic questions: Is there a substantive message? Can it be sent and 
received? Has it actually been sent? One who cannot check off those 
boxes is not engaged in speech. 
In some situations, the sending and receiving of the message is 
obvious. Readers of newspapers understand that newspaper editors 
have chosen the materials that the editors think are suitable. In other 
situations, the issue is a bit more complex. In Turner I, the Supreme 
Court suggested that cable subscribers understand both that cable 
operators choose some of the channels that they carry and that for 
other channels cable operators are mere conduits, not speakers. In yet 
other situations, a substantive message would be sent only if the 
editor effectively communicated its editorial stance to the users. A 
cable operator that secretly blocked content for substantive reasons—
say, indecency, or positive references to its competitors—would be 
engaged in substantive editing, but it would not have sent a message 
to its users and thus would not have communicated that message. 
The definition of communication above is overinclusive. As one 
scholar has noted, this basic definition—which he summarizes as 
“communicative acts are those intended to convey mental states and 
performed in ways that are reasonably understood to be for that 
purpose”—is a “‘coarse’ definition of communication, because it is 
useful but overinclusive.”72 It would include everything typically 
regarded as speech but also some things that are generally excluded 
from speech, such as A taking a drug, trying to describe to B what its 
effects feel like but failing, and then giving B some of the drug so that 
B might share A’s state of mind. A giving the drug to B would seem to 
satisfy the consensus definition of communication above, but most 
judges and theorists would not regard it as speech.73 The 
disagreements come into play when one considers what elements to 
add to the bare-bones requirements. 
 
 72. John Greenman, On Communication, 106 MICH. L. REV. 1337, 1341 (2008). 
 73. Id. at 1341–42. 
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B. How Far Can This Take the Analysis? 
Let us see, though, how far we can get sticking with Turner I and 
the overinclusive consensus definition of communication. Some 
conceptions of the First Amendment would not treat the editorial 
decisions of cable operators as speech, but I will treat that as settled 
ground in light of Turner I. If Turner I and the broad understanding 
of communication are a baseline, the First Amendment will 
encompass some things that most scholars and courts would not 
consider to be speech. But can we reach some useful conclusions 
about what is covered by the Free Speech Clause? The short answer 
is “yes.” 
We can start with two guideposts. Turner I creates a lower 
bound: whatever is equivalent to the sort of editing that Turner I 
found sufficient, by hypothesis, and in reality as a jurisprudential 
matter, constitutes speech for First Amendment purposes. The need 
to give meaning to the words “communication” and “message” create 
a second guidepost: we should reject any theory that turns every 
business decision into one that satisfies the First Amendment. Such 
an interpretation of the First Amendment borders on the absurd and 
thus should be disfavored. 
The first guidepost does some work. Creating one’s own 
material, or substantively editing others’ material, will suffice under 
the Turner I standard. A webpage that a company creates is speech 
for purposes of the First Amendment. Note that this does not make 
the company a speaker for all purposes: an oil-exploration company is 
engaged in speech when it creates its webpage, but not when it drills 
for oil. But creating a webpage is a core expressive activity and will 
thus trigger the First Amendment. The same applies to substantively 
editing others’ materials. For instance, an Internet access provider 
that explicitly provided a substantively edited Internet experience 
(e.g., a service that blocked access to indecent material and presented 
itself as a “family friendly” offering) would be a speaker under 
Turner I. By hypothesis, customers would understand that they were 
being offered an edited service. Like cable operators, the Internet 
access provider would be editing in a way that sought to communicate 
messages, and those messages (because explicit) would be receivable 
by the public. More generally, whenever an Internet access provider 
is willing not only to substantively edit but also to make that editing 
clear—“We block the content you don’t want” or “We edit the 
Internet for you”—then it is engaged in speech for First Amendment 
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purposes. Turner I also indicates that a webpage that is merely a 
collection of links chosen by an editor for substantive reasons (like 
the Drudge Report) will be speech for First Amendment purposes. 
By the same token, many other activities will not meet the test 
created by Turner I and the overinclusive definition of 
communication. Transmissions can be manipulated and edited in 
myriad ways, and many of those forms of manipulation and editing 
will not communicate any substantive messages—or, in the language 
of Turner I, will not “‘see[k] to communicate messages on a wide 
variety of topics and in a wide variety of formats.’”74 
I will start with a basic form of manipulation that is particularly 
attractive to broadband Internet access providers: giving better 
service to an entity that pays more money and worse service to an 
entity that pays less. If the word “communication” is to have any 
meaningful content, this cannot qualify. Note that nothing about this 
form of communication is related to what is being priced (bits, oil, 
whatever). That is, the alleged communication would inhere in the 
pricing itself. Finding that tiered pricing constitutes communication 
verges on the absurd, as that would mean that virtually every business 
practice is a form of speech under the First Amendment. It is the rare 
business that does not give better service or products to an entity that 
pays more money. To return to the FedEx example: just as one would 
not claim that FedEx, in treating all mailings the same, was engaging 
in speech, one also would not claim that FedEx, in providing slower 
service for less money and faster service for more money, was 
engaging in speech by differentiating among mailings. Indeed, under 
this theory one could see prices of any sort as messages: the 
dichotomy would simply be between “no service” (if one is not willing 
to pay anything) and “some service” (if one is willing to pay 
something). Thus merely having prices would be speech under the 
First Amendment. And this principle would not be limited to 
companies transmitting speech. If tiered pricing communicates a 
message, it does so regardless of what is being priced. That is, if 
providing better service to higher payers sends a message, then it 
sends that message no matter what they are paying for. But if one 
considers giving better service based on higher payments to constitute 
communicating a message, that drains the words “communicate” and 
“message” of virtually all meaning. 
 
 74. Turner Broad. Sys., Inc. v. FCC (Turner I), 512 U.S. 622, 636 (1994) (alteration in 
original) (quoting City of Los Angeles v. Preferred Commc’ns, Inc., 476 U.S. 488, 494 (1986)). 
BENJAMIN IN PRINTER PROOF.DOC 4/14/2011  6:03:53 PM 
1704 DUKE LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 60:1673 
What about other choices network operators may want to make? 
In particular, optimizing a network for some modes of transmission is 
a major category of manipulation that has been a focus of supporters 
and opponents of net neutrality. Most obviously, if an Internet access 
provider wants to prioritize the transmission of video, is that speech 
for First Amendment purposes? Such issues of network and protocol 
design arise frequently in networks. Telephone companies found that 
they could upgrade and optimize their copper wires for Internet 
service. The same is true for cable companies and their coaxial cables 
and for direct broadcast satellite and their satellites. Cable companies 
changed their network design and protocols to move from analog to 
digital, and cellular telephony providers did the same. Cable and 
satellite providers changed their networks to provide for high 
definition transmissions. In making these decisions, did these 
companies communicate and thus engage in speech under the First 
Amendment? If the government had regulated any of these 
transitions, would such regulations have implicated the companies’ 
First Amendment interests? 
Designing a network to operate more efficiently, or to gain more 
customers, would not constitute speech for First Amendment 
purposes, because there would be no substantive communication. 
Every network operator—indeed, every business—designs its 
operations to run efficiently and gain customers. Treating this as 
speech would turn every business decision into speech. The analysis 
does not change if the Internet access provider not only optimizes for 
efficiency and/or to gain customers but also so informs the world 
through its advertising—e.g., “We have the best network for you” or 
“We give you what you want.” There would be a signal sent to the 
world, but there still would not be any substantive communication 
(and, again, a contrary conclusion would turn every business decision 
backed by advertising into a form of speech). 
An Internet access provider could argue that, in optimizing one 
mode of communication over another, it had a more specific message. 
The choice entails a preference, and the preference entails a 
communication. The Internet access provider might prefer video as 
intrinsically better than other modes of communication, or might 
prefer video because of the content it can offer—arguing, for 
example, that video can present the world in ways that other modes 
of communication cannot. One could further imagine that this 
message is sent to the world via a motto—perhaps “Video is better 
than text,” “We love video,” or “Video captures what is important.” 
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The motto would be speech under the First Amendment, but 
that does not transform the underlying activity into the freedom of 
speech, any more than “Flame-broiled is better than fried” or “We 
love flame-broiled” would transform cooking decisions into 
expressive activity encompassed by the freedom of speech. As to the 
underlying optimization for video: is that the same as the message in 
Turner I? No. Cable operators’ choices among channels are choices 
that entail content. And note that the cable operators in Turner I had 
made a service-based choice in the design of their networks—they 
chose to transmit television and not other forms of communication. 
But the mere fact that they chose television service did not make 
them speakers; their substantive editorial choices did. 
Turner I did not, of course, explicitly state that choices among 
modes of communication are not speech. But if preferring one mode 
of communication to another is, or encodes, a substantive 
communication, then every network design decision would be speech 
under the First Amendment. Every mode of communication has some 
advantages over others, such that one could say that the decision to 
optimize for that mode of communication thereby makes it easier to 
present information in a particular way. And every aspect of 
networks—the protocols, the hardware, the software, etc.—makes 
some communications easier relative to others. To pick one example, 
every decision that reduces latency has particular benefits for the 
transmission of video, and little benefit for modes of communication 
that are not latency sensitive. The problem is that none of these 
decisions entails a communication about content. Every mode of 
communication has different properties (that is what makes them 
different modes of communication), but that is totally separate from 
having differences in content. Nothing in the modes themselves 
entails such differences, and thus a choice among them is not a choice 
about content. There is no substantive message communicated by a 
network operator’s optimization for a particular mode of 
communication. 
If a network operator chose to optimize its network for messages 
about politics (or golf), that might be a substantive communication. 
Similarly, if it chose to give faster service to text messages on 
particular subjects, that might be a substantive communication. But 
choices among services do not entail substantive communications. 
What about blocking material that the Internet access provider 
deems harmful? The key, as the previous discussion suggests, is 
whether the blocking entails a communication about content. In 
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blocking, is the blocker making a substantive decision about what 
content it wants to be associated with, and sending that message to its 
users? Blocking for the sake of keeping the network running (for 
example, blocking software that could bring down the network) is an 
example of nonsubstantive editing. If that were considered 
communication, then every action any network takes to protect 
itself—including ensuring adequate power supplies or air 
conditioning units—would be communication. But one can imagine 
blocking in which the network operator is blocking for substantive 
reasons and communicating those substantive reasons to its users. 
Indeed, that characterizes the hypothetical of the family-friendly 
service that blocks indecent material: the operator would be offering 
a service that was edited for content and presented as such to the 
public. 
This does not necessarily mean that an editor must use a content-
based filter to engage in substantive editing. If, for example, a family-
friendly Internet service concluded that the vast majority of messages 
emanating from a particular server, or sent to a particular port, 
contained pornography, it might block all messages from that server 
or to that port as part of its commitment to blocking indecency. The 
reason for blocking would be content based. The filter would be a 
proxy for content. But the filter itself would not be content based. 
This leads to the last major form of arguable editing that Internet 
access providers engage in: the blocking of spam and malware. Is such 
blocking covered by the Free Speech Clause? Before considering that 
question, one might want to ask whether anything turns on the 
answer. The net neutrality regulations allow Internet access providers 
to block spam and malware, and it is extremely unlikely that the 
government will ever regulate this aspect of Internet access providers’ 
behavior. This means that, whether or not blocking spam and 
malware is part of the freedom of speech, it is extremely unlikely that 
the government will restrict Internet access providers’ ability to 
engage in that activity. Does this render irrelevant the question 
whether blocking spam and malware constitutes speech? 
The basic argument on each side is reasonably straightforward. If 
being a speaker for one purpose makes one a speaker for all 
purposes, then as soon as an Internet access provider engages in one 
form of speech, all its activities would be covered by the Free Speech 
Clause. The counterargument is that the First Amendment is framed 
in terms of speech, and the relevant question is whether a particular 
regulation abridges the freedom of speech. If the legal regime leaves 
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the speech acts of an entity untouched, then regulation of the entity’s 
other acts does not implicate the Free Speech Clause. 
The broadest version of the argument that one is a speaker for 
all purposes seems wrong. As I already noted, a company is a speaker 
for purposes of its advertisements, but that does not mean that what it 
is advertising is speech or that the company is a speaker for all 
purposes. A narrower version of the argument is that any regulation 
related to the conduct giving rise to speech is a regulation of the 
freedom of speech. But that still leaves the question of what relation 
is actually required. 
The Supreme Court has applied laws of general applicability to 
speakers and held that they do not raise First Amendment issues.75 
But what about more specific laws that single out speakers without 
directly regulating their speech? The most relevant line of cases 
involves taxation of speakers. In Minneapolis Star & Tribune Co. v. 
Minnesota Commissioner of Revenue,76 the Court held the First 
Amendment applicable to taxation that discriminated among print 
publications.77 A few years later, in Arkansas Writers’ Project, Inc. v. 
Ragland,78 the Court suggested that any law that singled out a set of 
speakers for special treatment was subject to First Amendment 
scrutiny.79 But in Leathers v. Medlock,80 the Court held that First 
Amendment review applies only to differential taxation schemes that 
threaten to suppress the expression of particular ideas or viewpoints, 
target a small group of speakers, or discriminate based on the content 
of speech.81 Leathers stated that “differential taxation of speakers, 
even members of the press, does not implicate the First Amendment 
 
 75. See Cohen v. Cowles Media Co., 501 U.S. 663, 669 (1991) (“[G]enerally applicable laws 
do not offend the First Amendment simply because their enforcement against the press has 
incidental effects on its ability to gather and report the news.”); Associated Press v. United 
States, 326 U.S. 1, 19–20 (1945) (applying generally applicable antitrust laws to a company’s 
core First Amendment activities); see also Associated Press, 326 U.S. at 7 (“The fact that the 
publisher handles news while others handle food does not . . . afford the publisher a peculiar 
constitutional sanctuary in which he can with impunity violate laws regulating his business 
practices.”). 
 76. Minneapolis Star & Tribune Co. v. Minn. Comm’r of Revenue, 460 U.S. 575 (1983). 
 77. Id. at 592–93. 
 78. Ark. Writers’ Project, Inc. v. Ragland, 481 U.S. 221 (1987). 
 79. Id. at 228; see also Turner I, 512 U.S. at 640–41 (“[L]aws that single out the press, or 
certain elements thereof, for special treatment ‘pose a particular danger of abuse by the State,’ 
and so are always subject to at least some degree of heightened First Amendment scrutiny.” 
(quoting Ark. Writers’ Project, 481 U.S. at 228)). 
 80. Leathers v. Medlock, 499 U.S. 439 (1991). 
 81. Id. at 447. 
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unless the tax is directed at, or presents the danger of suppressing, 
particular ideas.”82 
The D.C. Circuit, meanwhile, has treated all regulations of cable 
operators as raising First Amendment issues. Some of these 
regulations directly relate to the speech in which cable operators 
engage.83 Requiring cable operators to set aside some of their capacity 
for public, educational, and governmental channels, and for stations 
subject to leased access, for instance, could reduce the number of 
channels over which cable operators can exercise editorial control 
and thus limit their ability to engage in speech for First Amendment 
purposes.84 Similarly, if the blocking of spam and malware were 
speech and a regulation had the effect of preventing an Internet 
access provider from engaging in such blocking, that regulation would 
reduce the ability of an Internet access provider to engage in speech. 
Other regulations that the D.C. Circuit has subjected to First 
Amendment scrutiny have no direct connection to the cable 
operators’ editing. The best example is the regulation of the rates that 
cable companies can charge to their customers. The D.C. Circuit, with 
little discussion, held that such regulation is subject to First 
Amendment scrutiny.85 And the nexus between rate regulation and 
cable operators’ exercise of editorial discretion is not obvious. One 
could argue that rate regulation reduces revenues, and that having 
less revenue limits the ability of a cable operator to produce the 
content it wants and to exercise editorial discretion as it sees fit.86 But 
this would suggest that virtually every regulation that specifically 
applies to a company engaged in speech will be subject to First 
 
 82. Id. at 453. 
 83. For example, the vertical concentration limits, which limit the percentage of channels in 
which a cable operator has an ownership interest that it can include in its lineup, constrain 
operators’ choices of which channels to air. See 47 U.S.C. § 533(f)(1)(B) (2006) (“[The FCC] 
shall establish[] reasonable limits on the number of channels on a cable system that can be 
occupied by a video programmer in which a cable operator has an attributable interest . . . .”); 
Time Warner Entm’t Co. v. FCC, 240 F.3d 1126, 1130 (D.C. Cir. 2001) (applying First 
Amendment scrutiny to rules promulgated under § 533(f)(1)(B)). 
 84. See Time Warner Entm’t Co. v. FCC, 93 F.3d 957, 973 (D.C. Cir. 1996) (finding that 
such regulation could present First Amendment issues, but rejecting a facial challenge to the 
particular statute at issue). 
 85. Time Warner Entm’t Co. v. FCC, 56 F.3d 151, 181–82 (D.C. Cir. 1995). 
 86. See Christopher S. Yoo, Architectural Censorship and the FCC, 78 S. CAL. L. REV. 669, 
687 (2005) (contending that “rate regulation had the unintended consequence of degrading the 
quality of existing cable offerings and foreclosing the emergence of higher quality channel 
packages despite viewers’ willingness to pay for them”). 
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Amendment scrutiny, because almost any regulation can have the 
effect of reducing revenue. 
Unfortunately for this Article’s purposes, the Supreme Court has 
not considered cases involving the rate regulation of cable television 
service or other regulations that have no more connection to speech 
than would any ordinary regulation.87 That is, every regulation to 
which the Court has applied First Amendment scrutiny has had some 
additional element, and thus the Court has never considered the 
applicability of the First Amendment to a regulation whose only 
connection to speech is that it is not of general applicability and 
applies to an entity that engages in speech. And, needless to say, 
different conceptions of the First Amendment would treat these 
regulations differently. Conceptions focusing on autonomy and self-
expression, for example, would reject as ridiculous the application of 
the First Amendment to economic regulation of companies engaged 
in speech. The absence of Supreme Court case law or conceptual 
agreement is unfortunate for my purposes because, in this Article, I 
want to see how far we can go based on broadly accepted sources and 
forms of reasoning. And with respect to generic regulations of 
speakers—that is, regulations that are not directly connected to the 
conduct giving rise to speech and that betray no censorious goals, no 
preference for content, and no desire to squelch particular speakers—
there seem to be no broadly accepted sources, reasoning, or 
conclusions. 
I do want to note, however, the connection between this 
discussion and the previous Parts of the Article. There are two lines 
at issue—one between speech and nonspeech, and another between 
 
 87. The Supreme Court has invalidated statutes giving local officials authority to permit or 
ban distribution of newspapers and other forms of speech, but those cases focus on the 
possibility of content and viewpoint discrimination created by unbridled discretion to permit or 
ban. See City of Lakewood v. Plain Dealer Publ’g Co., 486 U.S. 750, 767–68 (1988) (“[T]his 
Court has long been sensitive to the special dangers inherent in a law placing unbridled 
discretion directly to license speech, or conduct commonly associated with speech, in the hands 
of a government official.”); see also Saia v. New York, 334 U.S. 558, 562 (1948) (“When a city 
allows an official to ban [loud-speakers] in his uncontrolled discretion, it sanctions a device for 
suppression of free communication of ideas.”); Lovell v. City of Griffin, 303 U.S. 444, 450–51 
(1938) (invalidating a regulation prohibiting the distribution of leaflets without the approval of 
the city manager). Indeed, in Lakewood the Court stated, 
This is not to say that the press or a speaker may challenge as censorship any law 
involving discretion to which it is subject. The law must have a close enough nexus to 
expression, or to conduct commonly associated with expression, to pose a real and 
substantial threat of the identified censorship risks. 
Lakewood, 486 U.S. at 759. 
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regulations of conceded speakers that do not implicate the First 
Amendment and regulations of speakers that do implicate the First 
Amendment. The further the second line is pushed toward the 
application of First Amendment scrutiny to all regulation, the greater 
the pressure on the first line. Consider, for example, the significance 
of a conclusion that mere transmission is part of the freedom of 
speech, combined with a conclusion that the First Amendment 
applies to all specific regulations that reduce the speaker’s revenues. 
Under such a scenario, all regulations specifically applicable not only 
to common carriers but also to carriers like FedEx would be subject 
to First Amendment scrutiny. This does not make either of these 
conclusions wrong, but it does highlight what is at stake. 
To return now to the blocking of spam and malware: one cannot 
say with confidence what, if anything, turns on the question whether 
the blocking of spam and malware is part of the freedom of speech. 
The net neutrality regulations impose no direct burden on such 
blocking. The regulations require nondiscrimination but specifically 
allow the blocking of spam and malware. But, insofar as it reduces the 
revenues of Internet access providers, a nondiscrimination regime 
may at the margin reduce providers’ ability to invest in spam-blocking 
software. This is a pretty tenuous connection, but as the previous 
discussion indicates, I do not think we can safely reject it. 
Assuming that the question is relevant, does blocking spam and 
malware constitute communication, and therefore speech for First 
Amendment purposes? It depends. As I have already explained, a 
transmitter protecting its own network is engaged in nonsubstantive 
editing. But protecting users from receiving material that they want to 
avoid is substantive editing. It may be that the transmitter’s filter is 
content neutral, but if its reason for blocking the content is 
substantive, then it is engaged in substantive editing. And if the 
transmitter communicates such substantive blocking to its users, that 
would seem to satisfy the requirements for communication and thus 
for the freedom of speech. 
This means that, to determine whether the First Amendment 
applies to an Internet access provider’s decision to block spam and 
malware, a court must determine both why the provider engaged in 
such blocking and, if there were substantive reasons, whether it 
actually communicated its substantive reasons to its users. In giving 
meaning to the application of the Free Speech Clause to purported 
speech, an adjudicator will have to determine if communication is at 
issue, and communication will often be context specific. To see if a 
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substantive message has been sent and received, a court must 
determine whether a message was substantive and examine the means 
by which it was sent. 
Is this a recipe for disaster, in that it requires courts to make 
determinations about both the existence of substantive editorial 
decisions and the communication of those decisions to the public? 
Perhaps, but courts make similar decisions all the time. It may be that 
they make them poorly and that the law should favor more easily 
administrable tests, but that is an issue that transcends the 
considerations addressed in this Article. 
To return to the question at hand: is the blocking of spam and 
malware speech for First Amendment purposes? As the prior 
discussion indicates, we cannot answer that question without knowing 
more. Depending on why it is done and how it is communicated, such 
blocking may or may not be speech under the First Amendment. 
Does the provider block solely to keep its network running 
efficiently, or also because it believes that its customers do not want 
the blocked content? If it blocks for substantive reasons (such as to 
protect its customers from content they do not want), does it 
communicate that to customers? Does it advertise itself as a company 
that “blocks material that you would not like” (or words to that 
effect)? 
C. Confidence Redux 
It turns out, then, that Turner I plus an overinclusive definition 
of communication can take the analysis reasonably far, although it 
still falls short of definitively resolving the question whether Internet 
access providers’ actions implicate the Free Speech Clause. That final 
answer will depend on highly fact-specific and contextual 
determinations. 
How would the answers differ if one were to resolve the 
questions I left unresolved—involving what conception of the Free 
Speech Clause, and what specific definition of communication, one 
should adopt? Would adopting a specific conception and a specific 
definition provide different answers to the questions addressed in the 
previous Parts? Yes, but only in the direction of finding that less of 
the Internet access providers’ activity is speech under the First 
Amendment. The reasoning I have employed relies on a broadly 
shared baseline that is overinclusive. None of the conceptions of the 
freedom of speech or the potential definitions of communication 
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would find the Free Speech Clause applicable to more decisions by 
network operators than this Article’s discussion suggests. Some 
conceptions of the Free Speech Clause, and some definitions of 
communication, would encompass fewer decisions by network 
operators than Turner I and the broad definition of communication 
would encompass.88 
If we are not prepared to limit or cabin Turner I, then adopting a 
particular conception of the Free Speech Clause and/or a particular 
definition of communication might affect only the question whether 
blocking spam and malware constitutes part of the freedom of speech. 
It would not change the answers to any of the other questions 
discussed. It might change the rationales for the other answers, and 
the confidence one has in those answers, but the answers themselves 
would remain the same. 
That said, adopting a conception of the Free Speech Clause 
and/or a definition of communication more precise than the one 
outlined in this Part would allow for more precision and more 
confidence. This is not surprising. The greater the agreement on how 
one interprets an area of law, the greater the likelihood of having 
confidence in a given conclusion. There would still be limits to this 
confidence, of course—none of the proffered conceptions or 
definitions of communication admits of high levels of clarity. But if, 
for instance, we were to decide that the First Amendment is focused 
on individual self-expression or personal autonomy, we would 
conclude with great confidence that it would not cover the claims of 
any company engaged in transmission. 
The analysis in this Part is contingent on Supreme Court case law 
that could change and a definition of communication that is by no 
means incontestable. But incontestability is an unrealistic standard. 
The point of the analysis in Parts II and III is that, even without more 
specific agreement, scholars can have reasonable confidence about 
most of the potential speech issues raised by net neutrality 
regulations. 
 
 88. If, for example, free speech, properly understood, is about individual self-expression or 
personal autonomy, then decisions by a corporation do not qualify because there is no 
individual self-expression or personal autonomy involved. See supra note 61 and accompanying 
text. 
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CONCLUSION 
First Amendment analysis is notoriously open-ended and 
dependent on the conception of the freedom of speech that one 
adopts. The aim of this Article has been to consider whether a basic 
legal toolkit and broadly shared principles can produce useful 
answers to some questions about what the freedom of speech 
encompasses, focusing on the nondiscrimination principles arising out 
of net neutrality rules. One way of understanding this analysis is as 
addressing the extent to which lawyers who do not have a shared 
conception of the First Amendment can use conventional legal 
analysis to determine what the freedom of speech encompasses. And 
one could substitute “the Supreme Court” for “lawyers” in the 
previous sentence. 
The point of this Article is that we can start from broadly shared 
premises and reach conclusions in which we can be reasonably 
confident. We will never reach unanimity or certainty. That is 
probably too tall a task for a field as mushy as law. But I believe we 
can reach a level of reasonable confidence. We do not have to wait 
for word from on high—or from the nearest thing in the lawyer’s 
universe, the Supreme Court—to find meaningful guidance. 
 
